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The psychology of language is the study of how 
we produce and understand language, how we 
read and write, and how we acquire these skills. 
These will also be the main topics of this 
chapter. Their discussion will be preceded by 
some remarks on language evolution and by two 
short sections on language as a generative sys-
tem and on the history of the discipline. Lan-
guage is the species-specific communication 
system of homo sapiens. As a product of evolu-
tion, it provided selective advantage to our 
ancestral hunter-gatherer clans that roamed the 
African savannahs. Much has been speculated 
about what exactly provided the evolutionary 
cutting edge of language. Dunbar (1996) 
stressed its role in social bonding. Primates 
regulate their bonding largely through groom-
ing, and the time spent on grooming – up to 
20% of the waking day – is directly related to 
group size. Early homo sapiens should have 
groomed some 40% of the day in order to 
maintain social cohesion in clans of typically 
one to two hundred members. Language is obvi-
ously an attractive alternative. Conversation can 
be conducted among several participants, who 
can be outside each other’s tactile reach. More 
importantly, conversation has always been an 
indispensable means of exchanging information 
about one’s intentions, beliefs, fears, hopes, 
joys, that is about mental states. Such a device 
must have attained substantial significance for 
the one primate that has a ‘theory of mind’. Sole 
among the great apes, our species has developed 
the ability to attribute mental states (such as 
intentions and beliefs) to our conspecifics in 
order to explain and predict their behavior 
(Tomasello & Call, 1997), and we understand 
our own behavior in similar terms. This ability 
allows us to monitor the state of the social 
network in which we participate and to act 
accordingly. Language is a marvelous device 
for exchanging information about mental 
states. How often do we use expressions such 
as ‘Peter wants to leave’, ‘Sue hopes to come’? 
But mental states tend to be recursive and 
that is easily grasped by saying such things as 
‘Mary thinks that Peter wants to leave’, or ‘I 
don’t believe that Mary thinks Peter wants to 
leave’. 
The evolution of human culture is unexplain-
able without assigning a central role to lan-
guage. The ability to converse makes it possible 
to share information of almost any kind. We use 
language to exchange useful experiences, to 
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transmit traditional skills to our children, to plan 
joint actions of various kinds, etc. 
Though the selective advantages of having a 
language are obvious, we will never be able to 
explain the present structure of natural language 
from the history of selective pressures that 
shaped it. That history has been irrevocably lost. 
Quite different from what Wundt (1900) sup-
posed to be the case, all existing languages are 
highly complex systems; there are no peoples 
with simple languages. The long co-evolution of 
culture and genetic endowment has universally 
done its work. What kind of complex system is a 
natural language? 
9.1 W H A T IS LANGUAGE? 
The major function of language is to share 
information about whatever is relevant or dear 
to us. This ‘aboutness’ is one of the core fea-
tures of language. Language is referential: ‘the 
dog’ (usually) refers to a particular dog; ‘a dog’ 
refers to one that has not yet been introduced in 
the conversation. ‘I’ refers to the present 
speaker. By saying ‘yesterday’ you pick out the 
day before today. Most words have meanings 
that can be used to refer to persons, objects, 
states of mind, or to even quite abstract states of 
affairs, such as ‘democracy’. Language is, in 
addition, predicative. It is used to say something 
about these referents: ‘the dog is limping’, ‘I am 
thirsty’, ‘yesterday was my birthday’. Predica-
tion is language’s core business. When you say 
‘Tom drove his new car from Paris to Rome’, 
you are predicating something about an agent 
(Tom), namely that he is driving some theme 
(his new car) from some source localization 
(Paris) to some goal localization (Rome). Agent, 
theme, source, and goal are the ‘arguments’ or 
‘thematic roles’ of this proposition. There are 
other thematic roles that can be expressed in 
language, such as ‘experiencer’ (‘John’ in ‘John 
loves flowers’) and recipient (‘John’ in ‘Mary 
gave John some flowers’). The predicate plus 
the thematic roles assigned form the sentence’s 
‘argument structure’. 
Closely connected to predication is modifica-
tion. When you say ‘his new car’ you are 
modifying or further specifying ‘car’ by ‘his’ 
and ‘new’. You can easily turn predication into 
modification to make reference more specific: 
‘the dog that is limping’ or ‘the limping dog’. 
The versatility of language is largely due to 
its generativity. We can talk about just every-
thing and to do so, we produce ever new utter-
ances. That would not be possible with a fixed 
set of expressions, such as ‘how are you today’ 
and ‘beg your pardon’. Rather, language allows 
us to combine and recombine a fixed set of 
elements to produce ever new composite expres-
sions. For instance, every language has a small, 
fixed set of consonants and vowels (‘pho-
nemes’). They can be combined in particular 
ways for building new words: ‘tran’ is a possible 
word in English, but ‘rtan’ is not. Every lan-
guage has a set of morphemes (some 20,000 for 
the English of a normal native speaker). Most of 
them are simple, meaningful words, such as 
‘dog’, ‘follow’, ‘green’, ‘you’. But others are 
meaningful elements that cannot stand alone as 
a word: ‘un-’ (as in ‘undo’), ‘-s’ (as in ‘dogs’), 
‘-ed’ (as in ‘walked’), etc. A large part of a 
language’s generativity resides in combining 
and recombining morphemes, to create more 
and more complex words; there is no end to 
what we can do: ‘vaccin’ Þ ‘vaccinate’ Þ 
‘prevaccinate’ Þ ‘prevaccination’ Þ ‘anti-
prevaccination’ Þ etc. This is called morpho-
logical or lexical productivity. There is, finally, 
syntactic generativity. In speaking, we combine 
words to create ever new phrases and sentences. 
There is no obvious limit here either. For every 
sentence we can create a more complicated one 
that contains it: ‘Peter wants to leave’ Þ ‘Mary 
thinks Peter wants to leave’, ‘I don’t believe that 
Mary thinks Peter wants to leave’ Þ etc. Some 
languages, such as Turkish, do most of their 
work with lexical generativity. Others, such 
as English or Chinese, capitalize on syntactic 
generativity. 
All languages have a generative system for 
dealing with the semantics of predication and 
modification, all have generative phonology and 
morphology for coining new words, and all have 
generative syntax for creating ever new sen-
tences. Linguists have also noticed surprisingly 
universal properties for each of these generative 
systems. There is no semantic system without 
agents, patients, or recipients. There is no phono-
logical system without phonemes and syllables. 
There is no syntactic system without verbs. 
However, as the archive of analyzed languages 
expands, linguists discover that many of their 
hypothesized universals turn out to be strong 
tendencies at best. Languages have evolved to 
solve similar problems in quite different, often 
idiosyncratic ways. Most European languages, 
for instance, have terms for ‘left’ and ‘right’. 
Their semantics of space makes a major divide 
between what is left and what is right of the 
speaker; this is called ‘deictic perspective’ 
(Levelt, 1996). But other languages partition 
space in quite different ways. Speakers of the 
Guugu Yimithirr in Australia, for instance, use 
an ‘absolute perspective’, roughly equivalent to 
our north–south. They would happily say the 
equivalent of ‘I have a fly on my north cheek’ 
and change it to ‘south cheek’ when reorienting 
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by 180 degrees. Syntactically, all European lan-
guages have phase structure; they chunk words 
together into meaningful, contiguous phrases, 
such as ‘the big elephant’, and phrases can 
become part of larger phrases, such as ‘on the 
big elephant’. But many Australian languages 
have no obvious phrase structure. Words that 
belong together semantically or syntactically are 
spread out all over the sentence, with other 
words intervening. Also Latin belonged to this 
class of free word-order languages. Finally, it is 
not even the case that all of the world’s 5–10 
thousand languages are spoken languages. There 
also exist natural sign languages. Most of them 
developed in deaf communities. These lan-
guages are as complex and versatile as spoken 
languages. 
9.2 HISTORY 
Language and its use has always been a topic of 
great fascination. Its systematic study goes at 
least back to the sixth century B.C.E., when the 
great Indian linguist, Panini, devised the first 
systematic theory of the sound structure of lan-
guage. This sophisticated system of phonology 
was orally transmitted to our present day. Ex-
plicitly studying the psychology of language is, 
however, a much more recent enterprise. The 
term ‘psychology of language’ (‘Psychologie 
der Sprache’) was coined mid-nineteenth cen-
tury by the German linguists Steinthal and Laz-
arus. Evolution theory was in the air. Linguists 
already had a good understanding of how the 
Indo-European languages had evolved over the 
last two to three millennia. But they were 
entirely in the dark (as we still are) about the 
original natural causes that gave rise to lan-
guage. Their guess was that language would 
naturally arise in the human mind. The origin of 
language would ultimately be explainable from 
psychological principles. ‘Fortunate advances in 
linguistics presuppose a developed psychol-
ogy’,1 Steinthal wrote in 1855, but alas, such a 
psychology did not exist. The ‘psychology of 
language’ was invented pour besoin de la cause. 
It was Wilhelm Wundt who took up the chal-
lenge. He went all out to lay the psychological 
foundations for a theory of language origins. 
Although that theory has long been abandoned, 
the spin-off of his two-volume Die Sprache 
(1900) has been substantial. With the greatest 
psychologist of his time dedicated to the psy-
chology of language, it had become a respect-
able discipline, which easily adopted the work 
of many others, such as the work by Galton, 
Ebbinghaus, Marbe, and Watt on verbal memory 
and word associations, Binet’s efforts to meas-
ure vocabulary size, Meringer and Mayer’s 
(1896) classical study of spontaneous speech 
errors, Broca and Wernicke discovering the left 
brain’s involvement in the production and com-
prehension of speech, Huey’s experimental stud-
ies of reading, Clara and William Stern’s (1907) 
first thoroughly data-based study of children’s 
language acquisition and so on. The psychology 
of language had become established. 
The European tradition, continued by Bu¨hler, 
Clapare`de, Vigotsky, Piaget, and many others 
has always been a mentalistic one. Language, 
after all, is a mental device. In North America 
the psychology of language increasingly 
eschewed mentalistic theories or explanations. 
Dominant behaviorism considered language 
behavior to be a system of conditioned reflexes, 
an opinion forcefully defended in the ultimate 
monument of that tradition: Skinner’s Verbal 
Behavior (1957). North America needed the so-
called ‘cognitive revolution’, vigorously stirred 
by Noam Chomsky, George Miller, Jerome Bru-
ner, and others, to return to a mentalistic psy-
chology. The mood of change had its termino-
logical effects. The new generation of cognitive 
psychologists coined ‘psycholinguistics’ for 
what had previously been called ‘psychology of 
language’. 
The American cognitive revolution exerted a 
major influence on late-twentieth century psy-
chology of language. Language came to be 
considered as a biological endowment of the 
human mind, the generative system unfolding 
quickly during the first years of life, stimulated 
by linguistic interaction with caretakers and 
peers. The mature, generative system came to be 
studied as part and parcel of a complex informa-
tion processing system, which performs the 
high-speed feats of speaking and language com-
prehension. Entirely new approaches were 
developed to study the implementation of the 
component linguistic processes in the human 
brain. 
9.3 PRODUCING AND UNDERSTANDING 
SPEECH 
The systematic experimental analysis of speech 
production and comprehension has produced 
growing insight in what is called the ‘functional 
architecture’ of language, the network of psy-
chological processing components involved in 
the generation and comprehension of language. 
Figure 9.1 is a schematic diagram of this pro-
cessing network. I will call it a ‘blueprint’ to 
stress that it is as much a way to summarize the 
plethora of research findings, as a guide to 
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Figure 9.1 Blueprint of the language user. Processing components involved in the 
production and comprehension of speech 
research: each component, its way of operating, 
its distinguishableness from or interaction with 
other components, its cerebral implementation, 
is or should be the topic of our research 
efforts. 
In conversation, speaking and listening are 
closely bound. A participant is both speaker and 
listener and the verbal interaction is often a joint 
enterprise among participants to accomplish 
some goal of mutual interest. What a speaker is 
going to say is at any moment dependent on the 
state of the interaction, the attentional states of 
the interlocutors and their common ground 
(H. H. Clark, 1996). 
Speaking 
The left side of the diagram shows the compo-
nent processes involved in the process of speak-
ing. Its input is called the ‘communicative inten-
tion’. Almost every verbal move in conversation 
is made to affect an interlocutor in some way. 
The intended effect is the speaker’s commun-
icative intention. The first step for a speaker is 
to consider how the intended effect can be 
brought about. Imagine the speaker wants his 
interlocutor to lend him her bike. How to 
accomplish this? The military approach is 
to make a command: ‘Lend me your bike!’. But 
this approach may deter a listener as being too 
direct; it can be more effective to ask whether 
the other party is able or willing to lend her 
bike: ‘Can/will you lend me your bike?’ A very 
careful approach would be to ask ‘Would you 
know how I can get there – it is really too far to 
walk?’ Such dances of politeness in conversa-
tion are universal in human cultures, as Brown 
and Levinson (1987) have pointed out. A 
speaker will estimate which move is most 
appropriate in the present circumstances. The 
move you opt for is the ‘message’ you are going 
to express. Messages come in three main vari-
eties or ‘moods’. You can declare something, 
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for instance assert that the dog is limping; you 
can be imperative, for instance by commanding 
your interlocutor to lend you a bike, or your 
message can be an interrogative one, for 
instance when you ask what time it is.2 
Whatever the content of a declarative, imper-
ative, or interrogative message you opt to 
express, it must have an argument structure. In 
addition, the predicate and the arguments in the 
message must ultimately be expressible in 
words. Therefore, a message consists of ‘lexical 
concepts’, concepts such as DOG, LIMP, LEND 
for which there are words in the speaker’s 
language.3 The arguments in your message refer 
to entities such as the agent, the recipient, the 
location of your predication. How to cast them 
in terms of lexical concepts? The referring func-
tion of language is at work here. You will try to 
make an effective reference for your interlocu-
tor. If you can truthfully refer to the same person 
as ‘the plumber’, ‘my friend’, or ‘the giant’, 
then which concept will you choose to activate 
for your interlocutor? If the interlocutor happens 
to know the tall man, but not that he is a 
plumber or your friend, you had better con-
ceptualize the referent as ‘giant’. This procedure 
of selecting an effectively referring concept is 
called ‘perspective taking’ (Levelt, 1996). Even 
two-year-old children show surprising flexibility 
in perspective taking (E.V. Clark, 1997). 
A speaker’s intention may be more complex 
than to express a single message. When you are 
asked to describe your apartment, you must 
decide what to say first, what next, etc. That is 
called the speaker’s ‘linearization problem’ 
(Levelt, 1989). Most speakers will make an 
imaginary tour, beginning at the front door 
and going from room to room in some con-
nected fashion. Linearization is always a 
problem when complex information is to be 
expressed. Try, for instance, to explain the game 
of chess to somebody. Linearization is also at 
stake when we tell a story, when we talk about 
personal events we were involved in (and this is 
most speakers’ dearest occupation). Lineariza-
tion, developing the plot, is one important aspect 
of our narrative skill, but there are many more, 
such as foregrounding and backgrounding of 
information, introducing referents in the story, 
etc. 
Perspective taking and linearization are both 
ways to guide the interlocutor’s attention. Still 
another way is to focus or defocus arguments for 
the listener. When you say ‘I have a dog’, you 
are introducing a new entity for your inter-
locutor, namely your dog. You focus it by using 
the full noun ‘dog’ and by giving it pitch accent. 
Your next sentence can be ‘it limps’. You now 
defocus the same argument by using a pronoun 
(‘it’) to refer to it. That signals to the listener 
that it is the same argument you just introduced. 
But now you focus the limping for your listener, 
the newly introduced predicate. 
Any message must ultimately get formulated. 
This involves a trio of operations: grammatical, 
phonological, and phonetic encoding. Grammat-
ical encoding begins by retrieving words from 
the ‘mental lexicon’. That is the repository of 
words we have built up in the course of our 
lives. Normal, educated persons will have some 
50-100 thousand words available (Miller, 
1991). Retrieving words proceeds in two steps. 
We first access what can be called ‘the syntactic 
word’ or the ‘lemma’, defined as the information 
about the word’s syntactic properties, such as 
that it is a noun, or that it is a transitive verb. 
Quickly thereafter (van Turennout, Hagoort, & 
Brown, 1998) we access the word’s ‘phono-
logical code’, which is used in phonological 
encoding (see below). 
Assume the speaker begins to formulate the 
message PEOPLE UNDERSTAND. It consists 
of a predicate (UNDERSTAND) plus an argu-
ment in the role of experiencer (PEOPLE). 
These are two lexical concepts, and they activate 
the corresponding lemmas in the speaker’s men-
tal lexicon. There is always some competition 
with other meaning-related lemmas (such as 
comprehend when understand is the target).4 
The amount of competition determines the speed 
at which the lemma can be retrieved from the 
mental lexicon (Roelofs, 1992). Here the 
retrieved lemmas are a verb (understand) and a 
noun (people). The next step in grammatical 
encoding is to couple the retrieved lemmas syn-
tactically. The lemma understand has a syntactic 
slot for a subject and that subject should express 
the experiencer argument. The noun people is of 
the correct syntactic category to fill that slot and 
it also fits the experiencer role. The syntactic 
coupling (or ‘unification’) succeeds and the result 
is a small syntactic tree people understand, with 
the lemmas in this particular order. Such output 
of grammatical encoding is called a ‘surface 
structure’. We can, of course, encode far more 
complex syntactic structures and we normally 
do this incrementally: we begin with the initial 
parts of the sentence and then ‘grow’ it to the 
end. That makes it possible for a speaker to 
begin uttering a sentence even before it is fully 
constructed syntactically. The most detailed 
theory of how speakers accomplish this feat is 
Kempen’s (submitted). 
As grammatical encoding is proceeding, pho-
nological encoding dogs it as closely as poss-
ible. Shortly after the lemmas people and under-
stand are selected, their phonological codes 
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become available as well. A word’s phono-
logical code is, by and large, its string of pho-
nemes. For the word ‘people’ this is the string 
/p/, /i/, /p/, /e/, /l/.5 For ‘understand’ it is the 
string /u/, /n/, /d/, /e/, /r/, /s/, /t/, /æ/, /n/, /d/. All 
phonemes of a word become simultaneously 
available (see Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999 
for details of the experimental evidence on these 
and other aspects of phonological encoding). 
These phonological codes plus the syntactic tree 
are used by the speaker to construct the syllables 
and the prosody of the utterance. 
How are syllables constructed? The evidence 
is that they are incrementally built up, starting at 
the beginning of the word. For ‘understand’, for 
instance, the speaker first concatenates /u/and /n/, 
which completes a legal English syllable /un/. 
Then /d/, /e/, and /r/ are concatenated into a next 
syllable /der/, and then follows the composition 
of the last syllable /stænd/. Notice what happens 
if the speaker is rather producing the utterance 
‘people understand it’. The syllabification would 
now becomes /un/-/der/-/stæn/-/dit/; there is no 
syllable /stænd/ here. A word’s syllabification is 
variable and context dependent. That is because 
syllabification straddles lexical boundaries; the 
syllable /dit/ belongs to both the words ‘under-
stand’ and ‘it’. This variability of syllabification 
makes it unlikely that syllables are stored in the 
speaker’s lexicon. They are, rather, generated 
‘on the fly’ as phonological encoding proceeds. 
Generating the prosody of an utterance 
involves the metrical grouping of words into 
phrases and the assignment of intonation. The 
listener can use these cues to decode the syntax 
of the utterance and to detect what is focused or 
defocused by the speaker. In English, Dutch, 
German, and many other languages (but not in 
Turkish) speakers generate an intonation con-
tour with pitch accent on the head word of the 
last phrase in the sentence. For the simple sen-
tence ‘people understand’ this word is ‘under-
stand’, which gets pitch accent on its stressed 
syllable /stænd/. This is followed by a so-called 
‘boundary tone’. If the mood of the speaker’s 
message is declarative, pitch will normally drop 
on the last syllable. In the example this happens 
to be the same syllable as the pitch accented one 
(/stænd/). But it will be the syllable /dit/ in the 
utterance ‘people understand it’. The boundary 
tone is very informative about the mood of an 
utterance. If the mood is interrogative, as in 
‘people understand it?’, the boundary tone tends 
to go up. 
The final step in the speaker’s formulating 
process is phonetic encoding. The whole pur-
pose of phonological encoding is to build a 
pronounceable structure. But how do the articu-
lators know how to execute the pronunciation? 
Let us return to the syllables. Syllables such as 
/un/ and /der/ and /stæn/ and /dit/ have been 
produced so often by a normal speaker that they 
are overlearned articulatory motor patterns. It is 
most likely (though not yet proven) that they are 
stored in the forebrain as whole syllabic ges-
tures, and retrieved as soon as they turn up in 
grammatical encoding. These gestural patterns 
are further adapted to the current metrical and 
intonational plan. In addition, we adapt the loud-
ness and intonational excursion of our speech to 
the environmental conditions, such as prevailing 
noise and distance from the interlocutor. The 
outcome of phonetic encoding and hence of the 
speaker’s formulation process (see Figure 9.1) is 
an ‘articulatory score’, which can be executed 
by the articulatory system. 
Speech articulation is the most complex 
motor behavior we can produce. Some hundred 
different muscles are involved in the generation 
of some 10–15 consonants and vowels per sec-
ond. This high speed is only possible because 
these speech sounds are coarticulated (A. Liber-
man, 1996). When you say ‘cool’ you are 
already rounding your lips for the vowel /u/ 
when you pronounce the initial consonant /k/; 
you will not lipround the /k/ in /kill/. As a 
consequence, consonants and vowels do not 
appear as distinct entities in the speech signal 
(like letters in printed words). The listener has 
the formidable task of reconstructing them from 
the continuously flowing signal. I will not 
review the articulation process here, but see 
Levelt (1989) and Kent, Adams, and Turner 
(1996). 
Monitoring and Self-Repair 
The speech we hear most is the speech we 
produce ourselves. We can not only attend to 
our own overt speech, but also to our ‘inner 
speech’ which keeps babbling during our wak-
ing hours and which we misattribute as the 
speech of others when we dream or when we are 
in an acute schizophrenic state. It is not exactly 
known what inner speech is. Jackendoff (1987) 
and Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) provide theor-
etical and empirical arguments respectively for 
the supposition that it is a phonological code, 
roughly like the output of grammatical encod-
ing. Whatever it is, we can attend to it and parse 
it just as we parse what is said to us by others. 
That gives us the ability to monitor our own 
speech production and correct impending 
trouble even before articulation has begun. This 
was probably done by the speaker who said 
and further to the ye- uh to the green dot. 
Here the word ‘yellow’ got interrupted within its 
first syllable. What does the speaker do when 
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communicatively disruptive trouble shows up in 
internal or overt speech? Levelt (1983) provided 
evidence that speech gets halted immediately 
upon detection of such trouble. But detection 
can be relatively slow, for instance when the 
speaker is just initiating a new clause and has 
little attention available for self-monitoring. In 
that case, halting may follow several words after 
the trouble spot, as in: 
And from green left to pink – er from blue left to 
pink. 
When we speak we monitor for two classes of 
trouble. The first one is appropriateness, as in: 
I am trying to lease, or rather sublease my apart-
ment. 
Here the speaker noticed that what she said is 
potentially ambiguous or underspecified for her 
interlocutor and she repaired it by becoming a 
bit more specific. The second class of trouble is 
all-out error. That happened in the yellow/green 
and green/blue errors above. We may also detect 
and correct syntactic error, as in 
What things are this kid – is this kid going to say 
correctly? 
or any other type of formal error. 
When we interrupt our speech, we often sig-
nal to the listener that there is trouble and the 
kind of trouble. If it is appropriateness that is at 
issue, we drop in an editing term such as ‘or 
rather’ or ‘I mean’. If it is all-out error, we may 
say ‘no’, ‘sorry’, or just ‘uhm’. The factual 
repair is produced quite systematically. Almost 
always the speaker takes up and completes the 
interrupted syntax (Levelt, 1983). 
Speech Comprehension 
When we listen to someone else, our main 
business is to find out what the speaker intends 
to convey (Ho¨rmann, 1976). Just as speech 
production, this involves a multilevel processing 
system. A first step is an initial acoustic analysis 
of the incoming signal. One thing most listeners 
are good at is ‘streaming’, following a speaker’s 
voice amidst all sorts of interfering noise from 
the environment. We can even attend to a single 
voice when several people are talking at the 
same time – the so-called cocktail party effect. 
We probably especially attend to those aspects 
of the speech signal that give contrastive infor-
mation on vowels (telling ‘put’ from ‘pot’ from 
‘pat’ from ‘pet’) and on consonants (telling ‘sea’ 
from ‘fee’ from ‘bee’ from ‘me’). Maybe we 
already detect whole syllables, at least stressed 
syllables. It is not well known what exactly is 
extracted from the noisy speech signal during 
this initial stage, but it does have a name: the 
‘prelexical representation’. 
The real parsing of speech requires phonetic 
decoding in the first place. As mentioned, the 
units of speech such as phonemes, syllables, 
words, prosodic phrases, are not freestanding 
units in the speech stream. One of the para-
mount problems in automatic speech recognition 
is the segmentation of the speech signal, in 
particular segmenting it into words. Human lis-
teners do this mostly easily and automatically. 
How do they do it? Let us first consider the 
English listener. In numerous experiments, Cut-
ler and her colleagues have shown that a main 
word segmentation strategy is to postulate a 
word boundary just before a heavy syllable (see 
Cutler & Clifton, 1999 for a review). A heavy 
syllable in English is one with a full, non-
reduced vowel, a syllable that usually receives 
primary or secondary word stress. Using this 
strategy, a listener will correctly spot the begin-
ning of words like ‘boy’, ‘beacon’, ‘article’, etc. 
The listener will mis-parse for words in the 
speech stream such as ‘alert’ or ‘connect’. How 
often will the listener, using this method, seg-
ment correctly when listening to normal fluent 
talk? In about 90% of the cases, Cutler and 
Carter (1987) computed. The segmentation strat-
egy works well for stress-timed languages, such 
as English, Dutch, or German, but it is not a 
universal one. In a stress-timed language there is 
a rhythmic alternation of strong and weak sylla-
bles and listeners capitalize on that rhythmic 
property of their native language for the purpose 
of segmentation. The main discovery of the 
cross-linguistic research project of Cutler and 
her colleagues is that listeners can always 
exploit the rhythmic properties of their language 
to derive word boundary information. But these 
rhythmic properties vary substantially across 
languages. There is good experimental evidence 
now that Japanese listeners are particularly sen-
sitive to the characteristic moraic rhythm of 
their language (a word like Honda consists of 
three timing units or morae, Ho-n-da), whereas 
French, Spanish, and Catalan listeners have been 
shown to utilize the dominant syllable rhythm of 
their languages. 
Can listeners exploit the speech signal to 
extract information on phrasal constituency? 
Some typical experiments in the psychology of 
language show that they can, to some extent at 
least. For instance, Levelt, Zwanenberg, and 
Ouweneel (1970) had four female native 
speakers of French read texts that contained an 
ambiguous sentence. Here is an example with its 
two versions (with their unambiguous English 
translations): 
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A. // veut vendre cet objet / vole a son ami 
(He wants to sell that object / stolen from his 
friend) 
B. // veut vendre cet objet vole / a son ami 
(He wants to sell that stolen object / to his friend) 
The text preceding the target sentence made it 
completely unambiguous and rarely did a 
speaker notice any ambiguity. The two versions 
(A and B) were spliced out of their texts: the 
‘context’ versions. After having read the texts, 
the speakers were informed about the potential 
ambiguity of the target sentences. Now they 
were asked to read them as unambiguously as 
they could in either version (A and B). This 
provided the ‘isolated’ versions (A and B) of the 
sentences. The context and the isolated versions 
of the sentences were presented to groups of 
native French listeners. They were explicitly 
informed about the ambiguity of the sentences 
they were going to hear, and invited to judge 
which interpretation had been intended by the 
speaker. They were correct in 75% of the iso-
lated cases (significantly different from the 50% 
chance level) and there was no significant bias 
towards the one or the other interpretation. This 
means that speakers can explicitly provide dis-
ambiguating prosodic information if asked to do 
so. For the versions spoken in context the cor-
rect score dropped to 60%. This still differed 
significantly from chance, but also from the 75% 
above. Clearly, speakers do not bother much to 
provide disambiguating prosodic information if 
the semantic context does the work already. An 
acoustic analysis of the context versions of the 
example sentence above showed that the cues 
they provide are of two kinds. In the A version, 
but not in the B version, there is a slight pause 
between objet and vole, indicating a phrasal 
break. In addition, that break is further marked 
by a marked pitch movement: in the A version 
objet ends at a high tone, vole begins at a low 
tone, whereas there is intonational continuity in 
the B version. 
Cutler, Dahan and van Donselaar (1997) con-
cluded their comprehensive review of research 
in listeners’ exploitation of prosodic cues to 
syntax by saying that listeners can pick up 
cues that mark a break. A prosodic break is 
quite likely to mark a syntactic break, as is the 
case in the above examples. However, speakers 
often do not mark syntactic boundaries pro-
sodically, as was the case in most of the text-
embedded sentences above. Hence, listeners 
must have additional ways of parsing a sentence 
syntactically. 
The initial segmentation of word-like and 
phrasal units is the listener’s stepping stone to 
further morpho-phonological decoding of the 
speech signal. Central here is the process of 
word recognition. The core result of word recog-
nition research since Morton’s (1969) seminal 
publication is that an incoming speech signal 
causes multiple word activation in the listener’s 
mind. Words compatible with a given stretch of 
speech are simultaneously activated by it. Such 
a set of co-activated word candidates is tech-
nically called a ‘cohort’ (Marslen-Wilson & 
Welsh, 1978). Models of word recognition give 
varying accounts of how a cohort gets resolved. 
How does the listener reduce it to a single, most 
likely solution, the recognized word? Here is an 
example of cohort reduction as originally pro-
posed by Marslen-Wilson and Welsh: The lis-
tener receives as input the spoken word signal 
trespass. The first stretch of speech, tr activates 
words in the listener’s mental lexicon that begin 
with ‘tr-’, such as ‘trap’, ‘tremble’, ‘treasure’, 
‘treat’ and, of course, ‘trespass’. All of them are 
compatible with this word-initial speech seg-
ment. This is called the ‘word-initial cohort’. 
When as much as tre has come in, incompatible 
words, such as ‘trap’ and ‘treat’ are deactivated, 
whereas compatible words such as ‘tremble’ and 
‘treasure’ are further activated. When the input 
signal has come as far as tres, only a few 
candidate words remain, among them ‘treasure’ 
and ‘trespass’. Uniqueness is reached when the 
listener has taken in as much as tresp; ‘trespass’ 
is the only word in English that has ‘tresp’ as 
word-initial part. Reaching this so-called 
‘uniqueness point’, the listeners can recognize 
the word and experiments show that they often 
do. Notice that the word can be recognized 
before it has fully sounded. That is often the 
case (dependent on where the uniqueness point 
is located) and that can help the listener to 
‘predict’ the upcoming word boundary. 
But the situation is more complicated than 
this. Most words have other words embedded in 
them. In trombone there is the word ‘bone’, and 
indeed ‘bone’ gets activated when you listen 
to ‘trombone’. When you hear start you will 
coactivate ‘star’, ‘tar’, ‘are’, ‘tart’ (see Frauen-
felder & Floccia, 1998 for a comprehensive 
review of research in word recognition). To 
make things even worse, there are often embed-
ded words across word boundaries. Given the 
uncertainties of initial word segmentation, these 
can also play a role. For instance, the speech 
signal first acre will not only activate ‘first’ and 
‘acre’, but also ‘stay’, ‘steak’, and ‘take’ (Cutler 
& Clifton, 1999). Modern theories of word rec-
ognition (see Frauenfelder and Floccia’s review) 
explain how the ensuing within-cohort competi-
tion is efficiently resolved with optimal speed. 
Indeed, word recognition is very fast and often 
results before the word’s end has sounded. 
Many words that we encounter while listening 
to running speech are morphologically complex 
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(though languages differ substantially in this 
respect, see Section 9.1 above). They can be 
inflected forms, such as the past tense: ‘walk-ed’ 
and pluralization: ‘tree-s’. They can also be 
derivationally complex words, such as nominal-
izations: ‘walk-er’ and verbalizations: ‘vaccin-
ate’. There is increasing evidence that listeners 
attend to words as wholes, but also to their 
constituent morphemes. Listeners follow a 
‘double’ or ‘parallel route’ in parsing morpho-
logically complex words (Baayen, Dijkstra, & 
Schreuder, 1997). For instance, when a Dutch 
listener hears a plural form (such as ‘tree-s’ in 
English), the speed of recognition is determined 
by the frequency of occurrence in language use 
of that plural word.6 But if the same listener 
hears a singular form (such as ‘tree’ in English), 
the speed of recognition is determined by the 
sum of singular and plural word frequencies. In 
other words, it is determined by the frequency of 
the stem (the frequency of ‘tree’, whether occur-
ring with or without plural inflection). For an 
excellent review of morphological decoding, see 
Schriefers (1998). It may be useful for a listener 
to parse morphology, in particular inflection. In 
many languages grammatical decoding would 
be all but impossible without the listener’s 
attending to inflectional markers. In German, for 
instance, listeners would be at a loss to dis-
tinguish between ‘Der Peter rief den Hans an’ 
(Peter called up Hans) and ‘Den Peter rief der 
Hans an’ (It was Peter that Hans called up) if 
they did not notice the nominative versus accu-
sative case marking on the determiners, ‘der’ 
versus ‘den’ (the prosody of the two sentences 
can be the same). 
As soon as words and their inflections are 
recognized, their syntax and semantics become 
available for the grammatical decoding of 
the utterance. This is, by and large, decoding the 
argument structure. Like word recognition, 
grammatical decoding is an incremental opera-
tion. It begins as soon as the first word is 
recognized and develops with every further rec-
ognized word or morpheme. Also, grammatical 
decoding is ‘omnivorous’: it ingests everything, 
uses any kind of information it encounters. The 
relevant information can be syntactic, but in 
many cases the listener uses semantic or prag-
matic cues just as fast as syntactic ones. This 
immediate and massive use of whatever useful 
cues we can pick up is necessary, because 
almost every utterance we listen to is multiply 
ambiguous. The utterance ‘my pupil’ is ambig-
uous, because ‘pupil’ can mean ‘part of the eye’ 
or ‘student’. A listener will not notice the ambi-
guity when hearing ‘my eye’s pupil’ in which 
the ‘part of the eye’ interpretation is strongly 
invited. Only very precise reaction time meas-
urements show that the alternative ‘student’ 
meaning is temporarily activated, but then 
quickly suppressed. As listeners, we are rarely 
aware of the fact that almost any word we 
encounter has multiple meanings. In order to 
derive the argument structure of an utterance, 
information of the kind ‘Who did what to 
whom’, we are much dependent on recognizing 
the verb or verbs in an utterance. Encountering 
the word ‘see’, we know immediately that it 
must induce the argument structure ‘someone 
sees something’ and we will try to assign other 
words or phrases in the sentence to these ‘some-
one’ and ‘something’ roles. But this is not 
without problems either, because we will often 
meet local syntactic ambiguities as we proceed. 
The ‘something’ argument of ‘see’, for instance, 
can be an entity such as a person or an object (‘I 
see the signpost’), but it can also be an event 
(‘I see the weather change’). This can easily lead 
to parsing trouble, as in reading the following 
newspaper headline (from Altmann, 1997): 
Crowds rushing to see Pope trample six to death 
Certainly, the newspaper did not intend to con-
vey that the Pope trampled six to death, but it is 
a possible reading of this sentence. That this 
ambiguity goes unnoticed is due to a combina-
tion of parsing strategies we have as readers or 
listeners. One is that we prefer the simplest 
possible syntactic structure compatible with the 
data. When reaching ‘see’, we prefer to assign 
the ‘something’ role to a simple noun phrase 
(like ‘Pope’) rather than to a more complex 
complement clause (like ‘Pope trample six to 
death’). Also, we tend to take early decisions. 
We can close the argument assignment of ‘see’ 
as soon as we get to ‘Pope’ and we simply take 
the risk that we must revise it later on. These 
and other syntactic parsing strategies have been 
the topic of intensive research, see Frazier and 
Clifton (1996). 
Clearly, other considerations will help us as 
well to cope with local ambiguities. We use all 
sorts of circumstantial evidence to zoom in on 
one solution rather than another. Our knowledge 
of the world tells us that wherever a Pope goes, 
crowds assemble to see him. There is increasing 
evidence that different knowledge sources, 
such as syntax, semantics and knowledge of 
the world, affect our parsing in parallel and 
almost immediately (Kempen, 1998; Tanenhaus 
& Trueswell, 1995). 
Grammatical decoding, in particular the 
assignment of argument structure, strongly inter-
acts with what is called ‘pragmatic and dis-
course processing’ in the diagram of Figure 9.1. 
In order to derive what the speaker intended to 
convey, the listener must find out what referents 
the speaker is referring to by means of the 
various arguments. ‘The Pope’ – which Pope?, 
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‘six’ – six what?, etc. Here the listener draws 
heavily on general knowledge, on knowledge of 
the conversational situation and on what was 
said before in the current discourse. An example 
of the latter is this. When somebody tells me 
‘My car has broken down. The battery is flat’, 
the speaker is making a definite reference by 
means of the phrase ‘the battery’. Which battery 
is intended? There was no previous talk about a 
battery. Still, I will immediately infer that it 
must be the battery of the broken-down car, 
mentioned in the previous sentence. I can make 
this inference because I know that cars have 
batteries. I also tacitly assume that my inter-
locutor is ‘cooperative’ – there would be little 
gain in conversation if we tried to trick our 
listeners into drawing the wrong inference7 
(H. H. Clark, 1992). In quick interactions, refer-
ring can be quite indirect, but still solvable. 
Nunberg (1979) presents the example of one 
waiter in a restaurant telling the other: ‘The 
hamburger wants the bill’. Here ‘the hamburger’ 
apparently refers to the customer who had a 
hamburger, not the hamburger itself. The ambi-
guity is easily resolved given shared knowledge 
of the situation. Still, the ease with which we 
resolve such ambiguous reference is a miracle. 
Inferring the referents of arguments in discourse 
is a major stumbling block for artificial language 
comprehension technology. That also holds for 
inferring the referents of pronouns. In their 
review of discourse comprehension, Noordman 
and Vonk (1998) discuss various cues that lis-
teners use in guessing the referents of pronouns. 
When you hear ‘Harry won the money from 
Albert, because he . . . ’ , your first hunch will be 
that ‘he’ refers back to Harry, the topic of the 
sentence. But when you hear ‘Harry trusted 
Albert, because he . . .’ , you will guess that ‘he’ 
refers back to Albert. How come? The inference 
is initiated by ‘because’; the speaker is going to 
explain why Harry trusted Albert. The typical 
explanation here is some quality of the person 
trusted. This is only one of many subtle determi-
nants of pronoun interpretation. 
It will often be the case that a listener, in spite 
of tremendous skills of interpretation, does not 
succeed in deriving the speaker’s intention. That 
is not dramatic – we are, in fact, accustomed to 
it and we possess a whole arsenal of interactive 
strategies to solve ambiguities of reference in 
conversation. Here is one example from H. H. 
Clark (1996, p. 172), the major study of these 
skills. Brenda and Alva are discussing paintings 
along the wall: 
Brenda: that green is not bad, is it, that land-
scape? 
Alva: What the bright one? 
Brenda: Yes. 
Alva: *It’s*8 
Brenda: *Well it’s* not very bright, no I meant the 
*second one along*. 
Alva: *Oh, that one over* there. 
Here the correct reference of the original ‘that 
green’ is progressively cleared up in extensive 
interaction between the interlocutors. In produc-
ing and understanding speech we negotiate 
meaning. 
9.4 ACQUIRING LANGUAGE 
It has always surprised psycholinguists that the 
complex skills of language use develop so early 
in the life of a child. By the age of 12 to 14 
months infants master basic phonetic operations, 
such as distinguishing the consonants and the 
vowels of their native language and producing 
the language’s most frequent syllables. At the 
age of 18–20 months most toddlers have a 
vocabulary of about 50 words, but then comes 
the ‘word spurt’: soon new words are added at a 
rate of some 8–10 per day, one per waking hour. 
With the expansion of the vocabulary, the child 
begins to make the relevant phonological dis-
tinctions and with each new word it learns how 
the word can figure in a particular type of 
argument structure. Grammatical encoding and 
decoding begin to shape up by the end of the 
second year of life. Surely, the five-year-old is 
not yet an accomplished native speaker, but the 
basic system is up and running. Evolution 
clearly designed us to be skilled linguistic com-
municators early in life, but it is unknown how 
this is programmed in our genome.9 Moreover, 
that consideration does not provide us with 
enough restrictions to explain this early pattern 
of development. Only detailed observational and 
experimental analysis can help us unravel the 
forces that drive early language development. 
The various components depicted in Figure 
9.1 have their own developmental pattern. The 
maturation of a component is in some cases 
quite autonomous, in other cases quite inter-
active. Surprisingly autonomous is the early 
maturation of phonetic encoding and decoding. 
A newborn baby is already able to distinguish 
native from non-native prosody. The womb is a 
low-pass filter and the fetus is able to pick up 
the low-frequency rhythm of the mother’s ton-
gue. Two-month-old infants can distinguish [ba] 
from [pa], [bæ] from [dæ] from [gæ], [wa] from 
[ja], [ma] from [na], [da] from [di] from [du], 
etc. In other words, they can pick up phonetic 
distinctions, such as voicing, place of articula-
tion, nasality, that may turn out to be relevant 
for the acquisition of their native language. But 
when they approach the end of the first year of 
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life, infants become increasingly insensitive 
to phonetic distinctions that are not relevant to 
their native language. Whereas six-to-eight 
months old Japanese babies readily distinguish 
between [ra] and [la], they loose this sensitivity 
by the age of ten to twelve months. Infants 
become ‘phonologically deaf’ to most non-
native sound distinctions (see Jusczyk, 1997, for 
a review of speech perception during the first 
year of life). 
A similar development is apparent in produc-
tion. A normal infant begins to babble at the age 
of about seven months. Babbles are repetitive 
and alternating syllabic patterns, such as [ba-ba], 
[gi-gi] or [di-ti]. These first utterances are 
entirely meaningless. Rather, infants begin 
building up a syllabary by attending to the 
auditory effects of their own spontaneous articu-
lations. Only when the basic system is function-
ing (around the age of 12 months), do they begin 
to prefer producing native syllables over non-
native ones. And only then, one or a few of 
these babbles begin to denote a person, animal, 
or action. In other words, meaning is not the 
driving force behind the child’s initial phonetic 
development; these skills develop autonomously 
during the first year of life in a sufficiently rich 
speech environment. 
Building up a mental lexicon is a highly 
interactive enterprise. By the end of the first 
year, the infant already comprehends a few 
words. This probably drives the first attempts at 
production; syllabic patterns that approximate 
the auditory effects of known words are selected 
to make the appropriate reference. The simple 
coupling of syllabic patterns to referents soon 
gives way to a tripartite development. The first 
aspect is phonological development. As more 
and more protowords are added to the lexicon, 
more and more syllabic patterns must be kept 
apart to make the relevant meaning distinctions. 
Somewhere between 1;6 and 2;6 children solve 
this problem by ‘phonologizing’ their proto-
lexicon. Initially, their protowords are whole 
articulatory gestures, but slowly they start 
attending to word beginnings, to word ends and 
to vowels as independently variable segments 
(C. C. Levelt, 1994). This provides them with a 
powerful ‘bookkeeping’ system for distinguish-
ing words in any of these positions: [pin] from 
[tin], [tin] from [tan], [pin] from [pit], etc. Also, 
during the same period, they develop basic skills 
in coupling two or more words prosodically. 
The first multiword utterances superficially 
sound like single words uttered in succession. 
And indeed, the constituent words often have 
long pauses between them. But more precise 
measurements show that non-final words in such 
utterances are shorter than final ones and that 
intonation drops from non-final to final words; 
early multiword utterances are generated as 
wholes (Branigan, 1979). 
A second aspect is the initial development of 
word meaning. During the first year of life, 
children have acquired basic knowledge about 
persons, animals, objects, actions, events and the 
first words are attempts to denote some of them. 
They tend to pick out whole objects (dog, chair) 
and whole actions (go, put), not parts of them. 
Although children assume that different words 
have different meanings, they quite early know 
that you can use different words to refer to the 
same entity, as one child (age 1;7) did when 
indicating his bowl of cereal first by ‘food’, then 
by ‘cereal’ (E. V. Clark, 1997). Perspective tak-
ing is an early skill. 
The third and most dramatic aspect is the 
acquisition of word argument structure. A 
child’s first two-word utterances can perform 
various functions, such as to express location 
(‘there book’), possession (‘baby shoe’), event 
structure (‘hit ball’), etc. There is beginning 
argument structure for the expression of declar-
ative (‘big boat’), interrogative (‘where ball?’) 
and imperative (‘more milk’) moods. The need 
to express more complex argument structure is 
the first trigger for the emergence of syntax. A 
child acquiring an inflecting language, such as 
English, French, or German, begins to mark 
argument structure by inflection towards the end 
of the second year. Words for actions begin to 
become inflected for tense (progressive, past, 
present) as in ‘Christy forgot milk’ (Bowerman, 
1990; child’s age 1;11). This marks them syn-
tactically as verbs. For each newly acquired 
verb, the child learns how to map its semantic 
arguments onto syntactic roles. In the example, 
the verb ‘forget’ puts the agent argument 
(‘Christy’) in syntactic subject position and 
the theme argument (‘milk’) in first object 
position. 
The way in which verbs map their semantic 
arguments onto syntactic roles varies consider-
ably. Take the verb ‘give’. One month later, the 
same child produced ‘I give mommy a bottle’. 
Here, the agent (‘I’) is again in subject position, 
but the theme argument (‘a bottle’) does not end 
up in first, but in second object position. It is the 
recipient argument (‘mommy’) that becomes the 
first object in the sentence. In spite of these 
differences between verbs, children initially 
make surprisingly few errors in their syntactic 
rendering of semantic arguments when they 
acquire new verbs. But errors do appear much 
later on, when the child has already mastered a 
substantial number of verbs. By then the child 
has sufficient experience with verbs to discover 
more general patterns in the syntactic realiz-
ation of argument structure. A child will 
then occasionally overgeneralize such patterns. 
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Take so-called ‘mental verbs’, such as in ‘some-
thing pleases / excites / bores / surprises / scares 
somebody’. All these verbs put the stimulus 
argument (‘something’) into subject position 
and the experiencer argument (‘somebody’) in 
object position. But there are other mental verbs, 
such as ‘like’ or ‘hate’ that do it the other way 
round: ‘Somebody likes/hates something’. 
When a child at a later age acquires a less 
frequent verb of the latter type, such as ‘enjoy’, 
she may erroneously put it in the wrong class 
and make the error ‘I saw a picture that enjoyed 
me’ (child aged 6;6 – example from Bower-
man’s (1990) analysis of these developmental 
patterns). By the age of twelve, children still 
occasionally err on Latinate verbs, such as 
‘donate’, patterning them after non-Latinate 
near-synonyms (such as ‘give’) to produce 
errors like ‘he donated the church some 
money’. 
As these examples show, important aspects of 
acquiring the syntax of the native language are 
lexically driven (E. V. Clark, 1995). The child 
first learns each verb’s typical syntactic frame 
and only later generalizes these frames to par-
ticular general kinds, for instance how to make a 
complement construction (‘I’ll help you to find 
the butter’ – see Bloom, Tackeff, & Lahey, 
1984). But there is much more to be acquired in 
syntax, such as the construction of questions, the 
use of pronouns, the appropriate use of negation, 
etc. Linguists try to discover patterns of syn-
tactic acquisition that hold cross-linguistically, 
in an effort to uncover universals of our linguis-
tic endowment (see Weissenborn, Goodluck, & 
Roeper, 1992). 
To become a native language user, the child 
must acquire more than phonology, meaning, 
and syntax alone. In order to act through lan-
guage, the child must become versed in a variety 
of conversational skills: the ways of turn taking 
and turn giving, the ways in which to phrase 
intentions politely and indirectly, the appropriate 
addressing forms, etc. Each of these begins to 
develop quite early in life, but full competence 
is not reached before puberty. This is especially 
apparent for the skill of narration. The child 
must learn to guide the listeners attention by 
making use of various linguistic devices. For 
instance, in an English-language narration one 
can use tense marking to foreground an event 
against a background for the listener. The child 
(3;9) who describes a scene with a boy and a 
frog in it as ‘The frog got out, when he’s 
sleeping’ focuses the listener’s attention on the 
frog’s action by using past tense and marks the 
boy’s sleeping as background by using pro-
gressive tense. The child narrator will also try to 
keep the listener’s attention focused on some 
agonist, once introduced, by using pronominal 
reference (as the three-year-old above did by 
using ‘he’ when referring to the boy that had 
been introduced earlier). And the narrator will 
package the information in chunks or ‘para-
graphs’ that the listener can oversee. Young 
children do not know how to do that. They often 
introduce each bit of information independently 
with ‘And then . . . ’ . As these skills develop, 
narration becomes more and more cohesive. See 
Berman and Slobin (1994) for an extensive 
study of how narrative skills are acquired by 
children in different language communities. It 
shows that our narrative skills are not in full 
swing before we reach adolescence. 
In literate cultures, finally, the child will have 
to acquire the culture’s writing system. It 
usually takes years of training for a child to 
become a skilled reader and writer. 
9.5 READING AND WRITING 
Evolution did not design us to become users of 
written language. The widespread use of writing 
systems is so recent in human history that our 
genome has not been affected by any selective 
advantage that a writing system might provide. 
The cultural evolution of writing systems 
involves a discovery and an invention. The 
discovery is that continuous speech is based on 
underlying discrete units, in particular words, 
syllables, phonemes. This discovery was made, 
long ago, in oral cultures. Panini, for instance, 
developed a detailed, orally transmitted theory 
of the phonemic structure of language. The 
invention was to map any of these unit types 
onto visual symbols. This greatest of all cultural 
inventions has been an exceedingly difficult 
process. It succeeded twice, or at most three 
times in the course of our cultural history, first 
to the Sumerians a good five millennia ago, then 
to the Chinese some four millennia ago (though 
they may have had access to already existing 
writing systems) and finally to the Olmec and 
Maya in Central America around 200 B.C.E. It 
is even much more recent – in fact not much 
more than a century ago – that mostly Western 
cultures began to impose literacy as a general 
educational requirement. 
The challenge to the psychologist of language 
is to explain the apparent fact that most of us are 
indeed able to acquire a writing system and to 
become fluent readers. Clearly, the skill is para-
sitic on two pre-existing skills, language and 
visual pattern recognition. For a major part 
reading is language comprehension as discussed 
in Section 9.3 above, only the input is visual 
instead of auditory. Following (visual versus 
auditory) word recognition, the two processes 
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largely coincide. The remaining differences con-
cern the absence of prosodic cues to phrasal 
parsing in reading (though partly compensated 
for by the presence of commas and dots), and 
the more dominant use of low-frequency words 
and low-frequency syntactic patterns in written 
texts. A major difference, also, is that reading 
is not an interactive process, where meaning is 
‘negotiated’ between interlocutors; the reader is 
alone in deciphering the author’s intention. 
As hunter/gatherers we evolved refined pat-
tern recognition. We became fast saccadic scan-
ners, quickly detecting and recognizing small 
visual patterns that are of potential relevance to 
us, such as shapes of leaves, fruits, silhouettes, 
footprints. That ability is marshaled when we 
scan a text. A skilled reader scans some five to 
six words per second, fixating about 80% of the 
content words in a text. This is about twice the 
rate of normal spoken language understanding. 
The fixation of about 200 ms usually suffices to 
recognize the word. 
The process of visual word recognition has 
become a major topic in reading research. When 
the script is alphabetic, the graphemic units to 
be recognized are letters or letter combinations 
that represent phonemes. These overlearned 
units are activated in the visual system by the 
characteristic contour patterns in the visual 
input. The ordered pattern of graphemic units 
activated by a fixated word has direct, parallel 
access to the orthographic word representation 
in the mental lexicon; this often suffices to 
recognize the word, in particular when the word 
is high-frequent. In addition, the graphemic 
units also activate ‘their’ phonemes and the 
reader can ‘assemble’ the word from the string 
of phonemes. This is, in fact, the only way for a 
reader to handle a new word or non-word, such 
as ‘flork’; it is also what a child does in the first 
stage of learning to read. This phonemic assem-
bling route remains active in the fluent reader; it 
gives access to the phonological word repre-
sentation in the mental lexicon. It is often the 
faster route for the recognition of less frequent 
words, words we have less visual experience 
with. Quite probably the direct visual and 
indirect phonemic processes are mutually rein-
forcing in skilled reading (see Perfetti, 1999 for 
a review of reading comprehension). 
The one most critical step in acquiring a script 
is to become aware of the linguistic units that 
are to be encoded by the visual symbols, or in 
other words to repeat the original cultural dis-
covery. This is relatively easy if the unit is a 
word. Children develop word awareness without 
much effort. But none of the existing writing 
systems, including Chinese script, is a pure 
word-to-symbol matching system; there is 
always phonology involved. It is harder for 
children to become aware of syllables as spoken 
language units. That is what a Korean child 
must acquire in order to learn Korean syllabic 
script. But most difficult for children is to 
become aware of phonemes. There is no sponta-
neous awareness of phonemes in illiterate cul-
tures, it is absent in illiterates living in literate 
cultures and many children never acquire reli-
able phonemic awareness, in spite of extensive 
training. It is not surprising that phonemic units 
do not stand out in spoken language. The articu-
latory gestures that realize successive phonemes 
substantially overlap in time, different from 
words and syllables. As a consequence, the 
acoustic word pattern does not contain discrete 
temporal units that correspond to phonemes. 
One can be a normal, fluent, and even skilled 
language user without having more than a 
rudimentary ability to become aware of the 
phonemic structure of a word. Persistent lack of 
phonemic awareness is a major cause of dys-
lexia (I. Y. Liberman & Shankweiler, 1991). It 
is, however, a short-sighted misnomer to call 
dyslexia a language disorder;10 it is not. 
9.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS – LANGUAGE 
AND THE BRAIN 
It has always been a challenge for the psychol-
ogy of language to dissect the implementation of 
language skills in the brain. Traditionally it was 
responded to by combining the study of 
language disorders with post-mortem brain ana-
tomical research. The advent of modern brain 
imaging technology, such as positron emission 
tomography (PET), functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI), magnetic encephalo-
graphy (MEG), and the registration of event-
related electrical brain potentials (ERP) has 
dramatically changed the possibilities to meet 
the challenge, because language processes can 
now be detected and localized in the intact 
living brain. For reviews of these important 
developments see Brown and Hagoort (1999), 
Stemmer and Whitacker (1998), the chapter by 
Friederici in Friederici (1998), and the section 
on language in Gazzaniga (2000). 
ERP and MEG, with their millisecond 
time resolution, provide on-line measures of the 
brain’s dealings with linguistic tasks. For 
instance, when a subject reads or listens to a 
sentence, every new content word releases a 
negative brain potential, peaking around 400 ms 
after word onset. The better a word fits 
the semantic context, the smaller the N400 
response. This N400 is probably generated in 
the anterior temporal lobes. Other ERP compo-
nents are particularly sensitive to syntax rather 
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than to semantics and they are generated in other 
cortical regions. Such findings support the view 
that syntactic and semantic operations, as much 
as they interact in sentence understanding, are 
subserved by separate, specialized systems in 
the brain (Friederici, 1998). 
The precise localization of specialized 
regions, however, requires the measurement of 
metabolic activity in the brain by means of PET 
or fMRI. Such measurements have already 
undermined the classical notion that the vicinity 
of Broca’s area in the left inferior frontal lobe 
has an exclusive role in speech production. 
Rather, this region is as much involved with 
speech comprehension, in particular with rapid 
phonetic and syntactic processing. 
The psychology of language is now firmly 
functioning in the larger context of the cognitive 
neurosciences. 
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NOTES 
1. ‘Glu¨ckliche Fortschritte in der Sprachwissen-
schaft setzen eine entwickelte Psychologie voraus.’ 
2. Speakers express other kinds of messages as 
well. We often use expressives such as ‘heavens’ 
(or worse) and what H. H. Clark (1996) has called 
‘collaterals’, such as ‘uhm’. 
3. I will denote lexical concepts by capitals. 
4. I will denote lemmas by italics. 
5. Phonemes are represented by symbols from 
the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) between 
slashes ‘/’. I will only slash the beginning and end of 
the string or delete slashes entirely when there can be 
no ambiguity. 
6. Word frequency counts are intensively used in 
psycholinguistic research, because word frequency is 
one of the strongest determinants of word recognition 
latency and of word production latency. The best 
frequency count for English, German, and Dutch is 
the one published on CDROM by CELEX and dis-
tributed by the Linguistic Data Consortium. 
7. We do do this occasionally, but that can only be 
successful just because an interlocutor doesn’t expect 
it to happen. 
8. Stretches in between ‘*’ marks indicate speech 
overlap between the speakers. 
9. The only information available is the involve-
ment of chromosome 7 in three different developmen-
tal disorders that have a strong linguistic dimension: 
autism, developmental dysphasia, and William’s 
syndrome. 
10. If a society suddenly requires all of its children 
to acquire bike riding (as is factually the case in 
Holland), some otherwise perfectly normal chil-
dren will turn out to find this very hard. By the 
same reasoning they apparently have a disorder of 
locomotion, a pathology in urgent need of medical 
intervention. 
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